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Abstract
Differential privacy revolutionizes the way we think about statistical disclosure limita-
tion. Among the benefits it brings to the table, one is particularly profound and impactful.
Under this formal approach to privacy, the mechanism with which data is privatized can
be spelled out in full transparency, without sacrificing the privacy guarantee. Curators of
open-source demographic and scientific data are at a position to offer privacy without ob-
scurity. This paper supplies a technical treatment to the pitfalls of obscure privacy, and
establishes transparent privacy as a prerequisite to drawing correct statistical inference. It
advocates conceiving transparent privacy as a dynamic component that can improve data
quality from the total survey error perspective, and discusses the limited statistical usability
of mere procedural transparency which may arise when dealing with mandated invariants.
Transparent privacy is the only viable path towards principled inference from privatized
data releases. Its arrival marks great progress towards improved reproducibility, account-
ability and public trust.
1 Introduction
The decennial Census of the United States is a comprehensive tabulation of its residents. For
over two centuries, the Census data supplied benchmark information about the states and the
country, supplanted policy decisions, and propeled many branches of the demographic, social
and political sciences. By design, the Census aims to truthfully and accurately documents
the presence of every single individual living in the United States by the time she or he is
surveyed. The fine granularity of its databases, compounded by its massive volume, portrays
the American life in greatest detail. If not carefully disseminated, such centralized and high
quality information would pose threat on the confidentiality to which all Census respondents
are rightfully entitled.
The U. S. Census Bureau is bound by Title 13 of the United States Code to protect the privacy
of individuals and businesses who participate in its surveys. The Bureau had in place protec-
tive measures to reduce the risk of inadvertently disclosing confidential information, with the
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first public available documentation of these methods dating back to 1970 (McKenna, 2018).
Up until the most recent 2010 Census, statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) mechanisms de-
ployed by the Census Bureau relied to a large extent on table suppression and data swapping,
occasionally supplemented by imputation and partially synthetic data. While these techniques
restricted the verbatim release of confidential information in the data products, what had been
missing is an exposition of privacy protection as a goal in itself. What aspect of the data does
an SDL mechanism regard as confidential? What does the mechanism aim to achieve? And
how do we know whether it is actually working? For a long period of time, the answers to
these questions were not definitive. We now understand that many traditional SDL techniques
are not just ambiguous in definition, but defective in effect, for they can be invalidated by
carefully designed attacks that leverage modern computational advancements and auxiliary
sources of open access information (see e.g. Sweeney, 2002; Dinur and Nissim, 2003). With
the aid of publicly available data, the Census Bureau attempted a “re-identification” attack on
its own published 2010 Census tabulations, and was successful in faithfully reconstructing as
much as 17% of the U.S. population, or 52 million people at the level of individuals (Abowd,
2019; Hawes, 2020). These failures are a resounding rejection of the continued employment of
current SDL methods, and an urgent cry for alternative privacy tools for the 2020 Census.
Part of what contributed to the failure of the current disclosure limitation methods is that their
justification appeals to intuition and secrecy, rather than explicit rules. If the released data
is masked, coarsened, or perturbed from the confidential data, it seems natural to conclude
that it less informative, and consequently more “private”. Letting alone the soundness of this
intuition, to create a disclosure limitation mechanism that works as such, its details must be
kept away from the public and never released. In swapping-based methods, not only are the
swap rates omitted, the attributes that have been swapped are often not disclosed (Oganian
and Karr, 2006). As a consequence, one can neither articulate in what sense is privacy protected,
nor how it is protected. The effectiveness of obscurity-powered mechanisms are therefore ill-
defined, let alone withstanding empirical attempts at breaking them.
While the gain in privacy is yet quantified, in the hope that some might come our way, a defini-
tive price has been paid. For data analysts who utilize census releases to perform statistical
tasks, the opaqueness of the privacy mechanism poses an acute threat to the validity of the
resulting inference. A privacy mechanism, suppressive or perturbative or otherwise, works by
processing raw data, modifying it to take value possibly different from what was observed.
In doing so, the mechanism injects additional uncertainty in the released data, weakening the
amount of statistical information contained in it. Speaking from a statistician’s point of view,
uncertainty alone is not a problem – in fact, we pride our discipline as the study of uncertainty
quantification. However, in order to properly attribute uncertainty where it is due, some min-
imal knowledge about its generative mechanism must be available. Unfortunately, such is not
the case if the privacy mechanism is intentionally kept opaque. If the analyst has no idea about
its inner workings, she often has no choice but to ignore the fact that a privacy mechanism was
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imposed to the data at hand. That creates the real problem: if we can’t know what was missing,
there is no way to correct for it.
Transparent privacy enables principled statistical inference from privatized data releases. If a
privacy mechanism is known, it can be incorporated as an integral part of a statistical model,
hence any additional layer of uncertainty that the mechanism injects into the data can be prop-
erly accounted for. This is the best way, in fact the only reliable way, to ensure correctness of
the inferential claims produced by privatized data releases, when a calculated loss of statistical
efficiency is present in the data. For this reason, it is crucial that the privacy mechanism will
allow for its design be publicized.
As a formal approach to privacy, statistical disclosure limitation mechanisms compliant with
differential privacy put forth two major advantages over their former counterparts: provability
and transparency. Differential privacy conceptualizes privacy as the knowledge to distinguish
the identity of one individual respondent in the dataset. The privacy guarantee is stated in
probabilistic terms, with respect to a random mechanism that imposes the privacy protection.
Below is the definition of the classic and most widely endorsed definition, called e-differential
privacy:
Definition 1 (e-differential privacy; Dwork et al. (2006)). A mechanism S˜ : Xn → Rp satisfies
e-differential privacy, if for every pair of databases D,D′ ∈ Xn such that D and D′ differ by one record,
and every measurable set of outputs A ∈ B (Rp), we have
P
(
S˜ (D) ∈ A) ≤ eeP (S˜ (D′) ∈ A) . (1.1)
The quantity e, called the privacy loss budget, enables the tuning, evaluation, and comparison
of different mechanisms all according to a standardized scale. For the 2020 Census, the defi-
nition of privacy is the e-bounded differential privacy (Ashmead et al., 2019), where the word
bounded emphasizes its sole difference from e-differential privacy in that n, the size of the
dataset which in this context is the Census, is public information.
In (1.1), the probability P is taken with respect to the mechanism S˜, not with respect to the data
D. The definition puts forth a concrete standard to check whether any proposed mechanism is
private, and if so by how much, simply by checking the probabilistic property of the mechanism
P. For example, the classic random response mechanism, in which every respondent supplies a
truthful answer with probability ee/ (1 + ee) and a random answer otherwise, is e-differentially
private (Ashmead et al., 2019). That differential privacy is provable means anyone will be able
to design new mechanisms and establish their privacy guarantee under an explicit rule.
The second major advantage of differential privacy, which this paper underscores, is that it
allows for the transparent specification of the privacy mechanism. The data curator has the
freedom to disseminate the mechanism in broad daylight, allowing anyone to examine, utilize,
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and critique, without compromising effectiveness of privacy protection. As a example, below
is one of the earliest proposed mechanisms that satisfy differential privacy:
Definition 2 (Laplace mechanism; Dwork et al. (2006)). Given a confidential database D ∈ Xn, a
deterministic query function S : Xn → Rp and its global sensitivity ∆ (S), the e-differentially private
Laplace mechanism is
S˜ (D) = S (D) + (U1, . . . , Up) ,
where Ui’s are real-valued i.i.d. random variables with E(Ui) = 0 and probability density function
f (u) ∝ e−
e|u|
∆(S) . (1.2)
The omitted proportionality constant in (1.2) is equal to e/2∆ (S), ensuring that the density f
integrates to one. The global sensitivity ∆(S) measures the maximal extent to which the deter-
ministic query function changes according to the perturbation of one record in the database.
For counting queries operating on binary databases, such as Census’ tabulations, ∆(S) = 1.
Deployed at the heart of the 2020 Census privacy protection algorithm is the integer counter-
part to the Laplace mechanism, called the double Geometric mechanism (Ghosh et al., 2012;
Fioretto and Van Hentenryck, 2019). It possesses the same additive noise composition as the
Laplace mechanism, the only difference being that instead of real-valued Ui’s, it uses integer-
valued ones whose probability mass function is identical in expression to (1.2), with propor-
tionality constant equal to (1− e−e)/(1 + e−e). (Note that contrary to what the name suggests,
the Ui’s are not Geometric random variables with a random sign.) Like the Laplace mechanism,
the double Geometric mechanism is also e-differentially private.
For a p-dimensional deterministic query function S, the Laplace and double Geometric algo-
rithms both add independently and identically distributed noise terms, integer or real-valued,
with scale e−1∆(S) to each coordinate of S. The deterministic query S, and in particular the
probability distribution of the noise terms Ui’s, are fully known, and anyone is free to simulate
from the algorithm if supplied a database of the same form as D. With differential privacy,
disclosure limitation draws parallel to a branch of public-key cryptography, where the entire
mechanism serves as the public key. Even if an adversarial agent has full knowledge of the
privacy mechanism, she does not gain an enhanced ability to break the “encryption”, violating
the confidentiality of an individual respondent’s identity in the database. The Census Bureau
released a detailed description of the differentially private TopDown algorithm (Abowd et al.,
2019) together with a GitHub code base (2020 Census DAS Development Team, 2019). The
unprecedented level of openness and transparency means far more than a serendipitous side
product from the developments of formal privacy. For anyone who utilizes statistical tools to
analyze privatized data releases, or care about the quality or validity of such work, however,
the transparency makes a world of difference.
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2 What can go wrong with obscure privacy
Data privatization constitutes a phase in data processing, which succeeds data collection and
precedes data release. When it comes to statistical analysis of released data, grave danger
awaits if one blatantly ignores the effect of data processing, particularly so if the obscurity of
the mechanism leaves the analyst with no better choice.
We use an example of simple linear regression to illustrate just how misleading obscure privacy
can be. Regression models occupy a central role in many statistical analysis routines, for they
can be thought of as a first-order approximation to any functional relationship between two or
more quantities. Let (xi, yi) be a pair of statistics measured in a geographic region i (such as a
census block) for i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose they follow the familiar model
yi = β0 + β1xi + ei, (2.1)
where ei’s are independently and identically distributed idiosyncratic errors with mean zero
and variance σ2. Usual estimation techniques for β0 and β1, such as ordinary least squares or
maximum likelihood, produce unbiased point estimators. That is, the slope estimator is
βˆ1 =
∑ni=1 (xi − x¯) (yi − y¯)
∑ni=1 (xi − x¯) (xi − x¯)
, where E
(
βˆ1
)
= β1, (2.2)
and the intercept estimator is βˆ0 = y¯− βˆ1 x¯, where E
(
βˆ0
)
= β0. Both expectations are taken
with respect to variabilities in the error terms only. Both estimators also enjoy consistency when
the regressor xi’s are random, i.e. βˆ1 → β1 and βˆ0 → β0, indicating convergence in probability
as the sample size n approaches infinity. The consistency of (βˆ0, βˆ1) is reasonably robust even if
the linear model exhibit mild departures from standard assumptions, such as when the errors
are moderately heteroskedastic.
Suppose xi and yi are deemed confidential information, and that they cannot be released ver-
batim. Instead, their privatized versions (x˜i, y˜i) are released, where
x˜i = xi + ui, y˜i = yi + vi (2.3)
are respectively obtained via additive perturbation. The ui’s and vi’s can be chosen according
to the Laplace mechanism or the double Geometric mechanism following Definition 2, with
suitable scale parameters such that (x˜i, y˜i) are compliant with e-differential privacy. We denote
the variances of ui and vi as σ2u and σ2v respectively, which corresponds to privacy loss budget
ex =
√
2/σu and ey =
√
2/σv. As the privacy budget allocated to either statistic decreases, the
privacy error variance increases and more privacy is achieved, and vice versa.
Suppose an analyst was supplied the privatized statistics (x˜i, y˜i), but was not told how they
were generated based on the confidential statistics (xi, yi) – that is, (2.3) is entirely unknown to
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her. In that situation, she has no way to proceed other than to ignore the fact that some privacy
mechanism was in place, and run the regression analysis by treating the privatized (x˜i, y˜i) as
if they’re the true, confidential values. If so, the analyst would effectively perform parameter
estimation for a different, naïve linear model
y˜i = b0 + b1 x˜i + e˜i. (2.4)
Unfortunately, no matter which computational procedure one uses, the point estimates ob-
tained from fitting (2.4) are no longer unbiased nor consistent for β0 and β1 as in the original
model of (2.1). Just how bad are they? Both naïve estimators, call them bˆ0 and bˆ1 are complex
functions that convolute the confidential data, idiosyncratic errors as well as privacy errors,
which renders a direct finite sample characterization difficult to obtain. Here we state a Central
Limit Theorem for the naïve slope estimator bˆ1, applicable when the sample size is large.
Theorem 1. Let vxn =
1
n ∑
n
i=1 (xi − x¯)2 and kxn = 1n ∑ni=1 (xi − x¯)4 respectively denote the (unad-
justed) sample variance and kurtosis of the confidential data {xi}ni=1. Assume limn→∞ kxn = k >
0 is well-defined. Privatized data (x˜i, y˜i) follows the generative model in (2.1) and privacy mech-
anism in (2.3). The naïve slope estimator for the simple linear regression of y˜i against x˜i is bˆ1 =
∑ni=1 (x˜i − ¯˜x) (y˜i − ¯˜y)/∑ni=1 (x˜i − ¯˜x)2. Then, as n→ ∞,
√
n
(
bˆ1 − γnβ1√
σ˜n
)
d→ N (0, 1) , (2.5)
where γn = vxn/
(
vxn + σ2u
)
is the biasing coefficient, and
σ˜n =
β21
[
γ2n
(
kxn + 6σ2uvxn + 6σ4u
)− 2γn (kxn + 3σ2uvxn)+ kxn + σ2uvxn]+ (σ2v + σ2) (vxn + σ2u)
(vxn + σ2u)
2
the approximate standard error.
Proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the Appendix. As a very special case when no privacy
protection is performed on either xi or yi, i.e. σ2u = σ2v = 0, then the biasing coefficient γn = 1,
and the associated variance σ˜n = σ2/vxn regardless of sample size n. This recovers the usual
sampling result for the classic regression estimate βˆ1. Otherwise when σ2u > 0, the biasing
coefficient γn is a positive fractional quantity, tending towards 0 as ex decreases, and 1 if it
increases. Therefore, the naïve estimator bˆ1 underestimates the strength of association between
x and y, more severely so as the privacy protection for x becomes more stringent.
When n is large, the large sample sampling distribution of bˆ1 has (1− α)% of its mass within the
lower and upper distribution limits
(
γnβ1 −Φ (1− α/2)
√
σ˜n/n,γnβ1 +Φ (1− α/2)
√
σ˜n/n
)
,
which are functions of the true β1, the confidential data {xi}ni=1, as well as the idiosyncratic
variance (σ2) and the privacy error variances (σ2u and σ2v ). Figure 1a depicts these large sample
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Figure 1: (a) displays large sample 95% distribution limits of the naïve slope estimator bˆ1 as
a function of σu and σv, privacy error variances of x and y respectively. Left panel shows
distribution limits (shaded gray) around the point-wise limit of the naïve estimator (black solid
line), if y is not privacy protected (i.e. σv = 0) but x is protected at increasing levels of stringency
(as much as σu =
√
2/ex = 2, or ex = 0.707). Right panel shows distribution limits if y is also
protected (at σv =
√
2/ey = 2, or ey = 0.707). True β1 = 0.5 (black dashed line). (b) displays
Coverage probability of the large sample 95% distribution limits for the naïve slope estimator
bˆ1, as a function of σu and σv. With no privacy protection for either x or y (σu = σv = 0), the
95% distribution limit coincides with that of βˆ1 from the classic regression setting, and meets
its nominal coverage for all n. Adding privacy protection to y only (i.e. σv increases) inflates
a correctly centered asymptotic distribution, exhibiting conservative coverage. However for
fixed σv, as privacy protection for x increases (i.e. σu increases), the bias in bˆ1 dominates and
drives coverage probability down to zero. Illustration uses a dataset of n = 500, with sample
variance of confidential x about 1.023, and idiosyncratic error variance σ2 = 1.
95% distribution limits under various privacy loss budget settings for x and y, and Figure 1b
depicts their actual coverage probability for the true parameter β1.
When the regressor xi’s are random realizations from an underlying infinite population, the
bias inherent to the naïve estimator does not diminish even if the sample size approaches in-
finity. We have that the naïve slope estimator
bˆ1 → V (x)
V (x) + σ2u
β1, (2.6)
and the naïve intercept estimator
bˆ0 → β0 +
(
1− V (x)
V (x) + σ2u
)
E (x) β1,
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Figure 2: 95% joint confidence regions for (β0, β1), derived from fitting (a) the linear regression
(2.1) on a pair of confidential (i.e. non-privatized) data (x, y) of size n = 10, simulated accord-
ing to the generative model (2.8); (b) the naïve linear regression (2.4) on 20 pairs of privatized
data (x˜, y˜) based on the confidential data analyzed in panel (a), according to the Laplace ad-
ditive mechanism (2.3) with privacy budget e = 0.25; (c) the correct model expressed as the
integrated likelihood (3.2), implemented using the Monte Carlo EM algorithm applied to 20
pairs of privatized data simulated as in panel (b). Concentration ellipses are large-sample ap-
proximate 95% confidence regions based on estimated Fisher information matrix at the MLE.
Orange squares represent the ground truth: β0 = −5, β1 = 4.
where E(x) andV(x) are the population-level mean and variance of x for which the observed
sample is representative. The ratio V (x) /
(
V (x) + σ2u
)
is the infinite-population counterpart
to the biasing coefficient γn, displaying the extent of inconsistency of bˆ1 relative to the popu-
lation variance and the privacy error variance of x. We see that if the regressor is not already
centralized, bˆ0 exhibits a bias whose magnitude is influenced by both the average magnitude
of x, as well as the amount of privacy protection for x. In addition, the residual variance from
the naïve linear model (2.4) is also inflated, with
V (y˜ | x˜) = σ2 + β21σ2u + σ2v , (2.7)
which is strictly larger than σ2, the usual residual variance from the correct linear model (2.1).
We use a simulation study to illustrate the pitfall with obscure privacy. To add to the variety
of comparison, the case we examine below is a small sample study with n = 10 only. Assume
that confidential data follows the generative process xi ∼ Pois (10), and
yi = −5 + 4xi + ei, ei ∼ N
(
0, 52
)
. (2.8)
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The privatized data (x˜i, y˜i) are subsequently generated according to the additive privacy mech-
anism of (2.3), where ui, vi ∼ Laplace
(
e−1
)
. The three panels of Figure 2 depict different sta-
tistical inference – both right and wrong types – that correspond to three scenarios in this ex-
ample. When no privacy protection is enforced, a 95% confidence ellipse for (β0, β1) from the
simple linear regression should cover the true values (in this case, β0 = −5, β1 = 4 represented
by the orange square) at approximately the nominal coverage rate, a high probability of 95%.
Panel 2a displays one such confidence ellipse in blue. On the other hand, when privacy pro-
tection is in place, directly fitting the linear regression model on (x˜, y˜) results in misleading
inference, as can be seen from panel 2b in which the naïve 95% confidence ellipses (gray) re-
peatedly miss their mark: out of the 20 displayed, all derived from privatized versions of the
same confidential dataset as in panel 2a with a privacy loss budget of e = 0.25, only a small
few cover the true value. We witness the biasing behavior precisely as established: the slope β1
is underestimated, displaying a systematic shrinking towards 0, whereas the true value of β0 is
overestimated, with β1 > 0 and E (x) = 10 > 0. In fact, not only do the naïve ellipses exhibit
inconsistency in capturing the true location of (β0, β1), they underestimate the inferential un-
certainty associated with the parameter estimates. Indeed, they are overly narrow compared to
the green ellipses in panel 2c, each representing an approximate 95% confidence region based
on the correct analysis on privatized data when the privacy mechanism has been properly ac-
count for. The green ellipses not only recovers the location of the true parameters, but also
displays substantially larger variance associated with them. We will discuss in Section 3 how
to obtain the right analysis displayed in panel 2c, suitable for general statistical model settings
beyond regression models.
The troubling consequence of ignoring the privacy mechanism is not new to statisticians. The
naïve regression analysis of privatized data generalizes a well-known scenario in the measure-
ment error literature, called the classic measurement error model. The notable biasing effect
created by the additive noise (2.3) of the dependent variable x on the naïve estimator bˆ1 is
termed attenuation. The bias causes a “double whammy” (Carroll et al., 2006) on the quality of
the resulting inference, because one is misled in terms of both the location of the true param-
eter, and the extent of uncertainty associated with the estimators, as seen from the erroneous
coverage probability within its asymptotic sampling distributional limits. In linear models,
additive measurement error in the dependent variable y is generally considered less damag-
ing, and are often ignored or treated as an component to the idiosyncratic regression errors
(Blackwell et al., 2017a). However in the privacy context, the consequence of privatizing y
shall not be taken lightly, for it directly affects the quality of any naïve model fitting performed
on privatized data, both by changing the effective nominal coverage rate of the large sample
distribution limits (Figure 1b), and by increasing uncertainty of the fitted model per (2.7).
Looking at the additive mechanism in Definition 2, the noise term Ui is a symmetric, zero-mean
random variable. This means that the privacy mechanism has the exact same chance to inflate
or deflate the reported statistic in either direction by the same magnitude. In other words,
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the additive privacy mechanism is unbiased. Thus, it becomes particularly worrisome how
an unbiased statistical procedure such as simple linear regression, when met with an equally
unbiased privatization algorithm, can wreak havoc and exhibit heavy bias. The issue is, while
the privatized data S˜ is unbiased for the confidential data S, if the estimator of our choosing is a
nonlinear function of S, it may no longer retain unbiasedness if S were perturbed. In the case of
regression coefficient βˆ1, the expression in (2.2) reveals that it has the form of a ratio estimator,
and same goes for βˆ0 which depends on βˆ1 as a building block. In general, the validity of ratio
estimators are particularly susceptible to even minor instabilities in its denominator. Replacing
confidential statistics with their unbiased privatized releases may not be an innocent move, if
the downstream analysis calls for nonlinear estimators that cannot preserve this unbiasedness.
Unfortunately, in the universe of statistical analysis, nonlinear estimators are the rule, not the
exception. Save for counts and averages, most descriptive and summary statistics involve non-
linear operations such as squaring or dividing (think variances and rates), which don’t fare
straightforwardly with additive noise. This intuition applies to many important use cases of
the Census releases, even including the assessment of impact due to privacy. For example,
Riper et al. (2019) evaluated the public release of the differentially private 2020 Census Dis-
closure Avoidance System (DAS; 2020 Census DAS Development Team, 2019) using a set of
segregation metrics as the benchmark statistics, and compared its effect when applied to the
1940 full-count Census microdata. The first evaluation metric is the index of dissimilarity per
county (Iceland et al., 2002):
d =
1
2
n
∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ wiwcty − nwinwcty
∣∣∣∣ , (2.9)
where wi and nwi are respectively the white and nonwhite population of tract i of the county,
and wcty and nwcty those of the entire county. All of these quantities are subject to privacy
protection, and one run of the DAS creates a version of {w˜i, ˜nwi, w˜cty, ˜nwcty}, each infused with
Laplace-like noise. If we calculate the dissimilarity index by naïvely replacing all quantities
in (2.9) with their privatized counterparts, the result can be highly unstable due to the fact that
d is a ratio estimator. The value may exhibit large departure from the confidential true value
particularly when the denominator is small, such as when a county has a small population, or is
predominantly white or nonwhite. For a particular run of the DAS, such departure effectively
constitutes an unknown bias, since the output is uniquely realized as a single draw from the
probabilistic privacy mechanism, and it is impossible to tell in which way may the result have
be impacted.
Privacy adds an extra layer of uncertainty to the generative process of the published data,
just as any data processing procedures such as cleaning, smoothing, or missing data imputa-
tion. We risk obtaining misguided inference whenever blindly fitting a favorite confidential
data model on privatized data without acknowledging the privatization process, for the same
reason we would be misguided by not accounting for the effect of data processing. To better
understand the inferential implication of privacy and obtain utility-oriented assessments, pri-
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vacy shall be treated as a controllable source of total survey error, an approach that is again
made feasible by the transparency of the privatization procedure. We return to this subject in
Section 4.
3 Principled analysis with transparent privacy
The misleading analysis demonstrated in Section 2 is not the fault of differential privacy, nor of
linear regression or other means of statistical modeling. Rather, it is the obscurity of the privacy
mechanism that prevents us from performing the right analysis. Any statistical model, how-
ever adequate in describing the probabilistic regularities in the confidential data, will generally
be inadequate when naïvely applied to the privatized data. In order to correctly account for
the privacy mechanism, statistical models designed for confidential data need to be augmented
to include the additional layer of uncertainty it introduces. In our example, the simple linear
model of (2.1) is the true generative model for the confidential statistics (x, y). Together with
the privacy mechanism in (2.3), the implied true generative model for the privatized statistics
(x˜, y˜) is in fact
y˜i = β0 + β1 (x˜i + ui) + vi + ei, (3.1)
where ui, vi are additive privacy errors and ei the idiosyncratic regression error. Thus, with
the original linear model (2.1) being the correct model for (x, y), it follows that the augmented
model (3.1) is the correct model for describing the stochastic relationship between (x˜, y˜). On
the other hand, unless all ui’s and vi’s are exactly zero, i.e. no privacy protection is effectively
performed for both x and y, the naïve model in (2.4) is erroneous and incommensurable with
the augmented model above.
If a statistical model is itself is of high quality, or more precisely self-efficient (Meng, 1994; Xie
and Meng, 2017), the resulting inference based on privatized data should typically bear more
uncertainty compared to that based on confidential data, with the increase in uncertainty at-
tributable to the privatization mechanism. In that sense, uncertainty quantification is of par-
ticular importance when it comes to analyzing privatized data. But drawing statistically valid
inference from privatized data is not as simple as increasing the nominal coverage probabil-
ity of confidence or credible regions from the old analysis. As we have seen, fitting the naïve
linear model on differentially privatized data suffers the “double whammy effect” of both a
biased estimator and incorrectly quantified estimation uncertainty. The right analysis hinges
on incorporating the probabilistic privacy mechanism into the model itself, to ensure that we
capture uncertainty stemming from any potential systematic bias displayed by the estimator
due to noise injection, as well as a sheer loss of precision due to diminished informativeness of
the data.
For data users who currently employ analysis protocols designed without private data in mind,
this suggests that modifications will need to made to their favorite tools moving forward. That
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sounds like an incredibly daunting task. What needs to be done, however, is quite simple on a
conceptual level, and a general recipe exists for the vast class of statistical methods that merits
either a likelihood or a Bayesian justification. We describe the recipe now.
Let β denote the estimand of interest. For randomization-based inference, which is common to
the literatures of survey and experimental design, this estimand may be expressed as a func-
tion of the confidential database: β = β(D). In model-based inference, β may be the finite- or
infinite-dimensional parameter that governs the distribution of D. Let L be the original like-
lihood for β based on s. It represents the currently employed, or ideal, statistical model for
analyzing data that is not subject to privacy protection. Let pξ be the probability distribution
of the privatized data s˜ based on s that is implied by the privacy mechanism. The subscript
ξ encompasses all tuning parameters of the mechanism, as well as any auxiliary information
that the data curator used during the privatization process. For example, p may stand for the
class of swapping methods, in which case ξ encodes the swap rates as well as the list of the
variables being swapped. If p is induced by the Laplace mechanism, then it stands for the class
of product Laplace densities centered at s, and ξ its scale parameter which, if set to ∆(S)/e,
qualifies p as an e-differentially private mechanism. We have that the true likelihood function
for β based on the observed s˜ is
Lξ (β; s˜) =
∫
pξ (s˜ | s)L (β; s) ds, (3.2)
with the notation Lξ highlighting the fact that it is a weighted version of the original likelihood
L according to the privacy mechanism pξ .
The integral expression of (3.2) is reminiscent of the missing data formulation for parameter
estimation (Little and Rubin, 2014). The observed data is the privatized data s˜, and the miss-
ing data is the confidential data s, with the two of them associated by the probabilistic privacy
mechanism pξ analogous to the missingness mechanism. All information that can be objec-
tively learned about the parameter of interest β has to be based on the observed data alone, av-
eraging out the uncertainties in the missing data. In the regression example, the actual observed
likelihood is precisely the joint probability distribution of (x˜i, y˜i) according to the implied true
model (2.8), governed by the parameters β0 and β1, with sampling variability derived from that
of the idiosyncratic errors ei as well as privacy errors ui and vi. All modes of statistical inference
congruent with the original data likelihood L, including frequentist procedures that can be em-
bedded into L as well as Bayesian models based on L, will have adequately accounted for the
privacy mechanism by respecting (3.2). Furthermore, if the analyst is Bayesian and employs a
prior pi0 for β, her posterior distribution now becomes
piξ (β | s˜) = cξpi0 (β)Lξ (β; s˜) , (3.3)
where the proportionality constant cξ free of the parameter β and ensures that the posterior
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integrates to one.
A privacy algorithm is said to be transparent if its associated pξ – that is, both the functional
form of p and the specific value of ξ employed by the curator to generate s˜ – is known. Equation
(3.2) highlights why transparent privacy allows data users to still achieve inferential validity
for their question of interest. To compute the true likelihood for β, one must know not only the
original statistical model L, but also the privacy mechanism pξ . From the data user’s perspec-
tive, there is no way to carry through the correct calculation according to (3.2) if the privacy
mechanism pξ or its parameter ξ is hidden. We formalize the crucial importance of transparent
privacy in ensuring inferential validity in the theorem below.
Theorem 2 (Necessity of transparent privacy). Let β ∈ Rd be a continuous parameter and h (β) a
bounded Borel-measureable function for which inference is sought. The observed data s˜ is privatized with
the mechanism pξ (· | s), and the analyst supposes the mechanism to be q (· | s). Then for all likelihood
specifications L with base measure ν, observed data s˜ and choice of h, the analyst recovers the correct
posterior expectation for h (β), i.e.
Eq (h (β) | s˜) = Eξ (h (β) | s˜) (3.4)
if only if pξ (· | s) = q (· | s) for ν-almost all s.
Proof. The “if” part of the theorem is trivial. For the “only if” part, note that (3.4) is the same
as the requirement of weak equivalence between the true posterior piξ (β | s˜) in (3.3) and the
analyst’s supposed posterior
piq (β | s˜) := cqpi0 (β)
∫
q (s˜ | s)L (β; s) ds,
where the proportionality constant cq, free of β, ensures that the density piq integrates to one.
This in turn requires for any given s˜ and the constant c = cξ/cq > 0,
E
(
q (s˜ | s)− cpξ (s˜ | s) | β
)
= 0
for β ∈ Rd almost everywhere, where the expectation above is taken with respect to the like-
lihood L. Since L was chosen by the analyst but pξ is not, this implies that she must also
choose q so that q (s˜ | s) − cpξ (s˜ | s) = 0 for all s except on a set of measure zero relative to
ν. Furthermore, since
∫
q (a | s) da = ∫ pξ (a | s) da = 1 for every s, we must have c = 1, thus
pξ (· | s) = q (· | s) as desired.
What Theorem 2 says is that, if we conceive the statistical validity of an analysis as its abil-
ity to yield the same expected answer as that implied by the model which properly accounts
for the privatization mechanism for a wide range of questions, then the only way to ensure
statistical validity is to grant the analyst full access to the actual privatization mechanism. As
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discussed in Section 1, prior to differential privacy, knowing pξ or ξ had mostly been an unten-
able luxury for most analysts, as traditional disclosure limitation methods such as suppression,
de-identification and swapping rely fundamentally on procedural secrecy. The arrival of trans-
parent privacy finally makes principled and statistically valid inference with privatized data
possible.
Scholars in the SDL literature advocated for transparent privacy for more than one good rea-
son. With a rearrangement of terms, the posterior in (3.3) can also be written as (details in the
Appendix)
piξ (β | s˜) =
∫
pi (β | s)piξ (s | s˜) ds, (3.5)
where pi (β | s) is the posterior model for the confidential s, and piξ (s | s˜) the posterior predic-
tive distribution of the confidential s based on the privatized s˜, again with its dependence on
the privacy mechanism pξ highlighted in the subscript. This representation of the posterior
resembles the theory of multiple imputation (Rubin, 1996), which lies at the theoretical foun-
dation of the synthetic data approach to SDL (Rubin, 1993; Raghunathan et al., 2003). What
(3.5) illustrates is an alternative viewpoint on private data analysis, which is that the correct
Bayesian analysis can be constructed as a mixture of naïve analyses based on the agent’s best
knowledge of the confidential data, where this best knowledge is instructed by the privatized
data, the prior, as well as the transparent privatization procedure. Karr and Reiter (2014) called
the Bayesian formulation (3.5) the “SDL of the future”, emphasizing the insurmountable com-
putational challenge the analyst needs to face without knowing the term piξ (s | s˜). With trans-
parency of pξ at hand, the future is in sight.
Transparent privacy mechanisms merit another important quality, namely its parameter distinc-
tiveness from both the generative model of the true confidential data as well as any descriptive
model the analyst wishes to impose on it. This is true since the entire privacy mechanism, all
within control of the curator, is fully announced hence has no hidden dependence on the un-
known inferential parameter β through means beyond the confidential data s. In the missing
data literature, parameter distinctiveness is a prerequisite of the missing data mechanism to al-
low for simplifying assumptions, such as missing completely at random (MCAR) and missing
at random (MAR), to be made. In privacy, parameter distinctiveness ensures that the privacy
mechanism does not interact with any modeling decision imposed on the confidential data. It
is the reason why the true observed likelihood Lξ in (3.2) involves merely two terms, pξ and
L, whose product makes up the implied joint model for the complete data (s, s˜) regardless of
choice of L. This is what makes the task of taking the privacy mechanism into account straight-
forward, and can bring potentially vast simplifications to many cases of downstream analysis.
The practical benefit of parameter distinctiveness of the privacy mechanism is predicated on
its transparency, for unless a mechanism is known (Abowd and Schmutte, 2016), none of its
properties can be verified nor put into action with confidence.
While conceptually simple, actually carrying through the correct calculation can be computa-
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tionally demanding. The integral in (3.2) may easily become intractable if the statistical model
is complex, or if the confidential data is high-dimensional (as is the case with the Census), or
a combination of both. The challenge is amplified by the fact that the two components of the
integral are generally not in conjugate forms. While the privacy mechanism pξ is determined
by the data curator, the statistical model L is chosen by the data analyst, and the two parties
typically do not consult each other in making their respective choices. Even for the simplest
models, such as the running linear regression example, we cannot expect (3.2) to possess an
analytical expression.
To answer to the demand for statistically valid inference procedures based on privatized data,
Gong (2019) discussed two sets of computational frameworks to handle independently and
arbitrarily specified privacy mechanisms and statistical models. For exact likelihood infer-
ence, the integration in (3.2) can be performed using Monte Carlo Expectation Maximization
(MCEM), designed for the presence of latent variables or partially missing data and equipped
with a general-purpose importance sampling strategy at its core. Exact Bayesian inference
according to (3.3) can be achieved with, somewhat surprisingly, an approximate Bayesian com-
putation (ABC) algorithm. The tuning parameters of the ABC algorithm usually control the
level of approximation in exchange for Monte Carlo efficiency, or computational feasibility in
complex models. In the case of privacy, the tuning parameters are set to reflect the privacy
mechanism and the privacy loss budget, in such a way that renders the the algorithm to out-
put exact draws from the desired Bayesian posterior for any proper prior specification. I have
explained this phenomenon with a catchy phrase: approximate computation on exact data is
exact computation on approximate data. Private data is approximate data, and its inexact na-
ture can be leveraged to our benefit if the privatization procedure becomes correctly aligned
with the necessary approximation that bring computational feasibility.
To continue the illustration with our running example, the MCEM algorithm is implemented
to draw maximum likelihood inference for the β’s using privatized data. Figure 2c depicts 95%
approximate confidence regions (green) for (β0, β1), using 20 simulated privatized datasets
(x˜, y˜), each of size n = 10. The confidence ellipses are derived using a normal approximation
to the likelihood at the maximum likelihood estimate, with covariance equal to the inverse es-
timated Fisher information matrix. Details of the algorithm can be found in the Appendix. We
see that the actual inferential uncertainty for both β0 and β1 are inflated compared to inference
on confidential data as in panel 2a. However in sharp contrast to panel 2b, the majority of these
green ellipses cover the ground truth (−4, 5) despite at a loss of precision. They represent the
correct inference because their derivation adequately infers the amount of uncertainty present
in the privatized data.
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4 Privacy as a transparent source of total survey error
In introductory probability and survey sampling classrooms, the concept of a census is fre-
quently invoked as a pedagogical reference, often with the U. S. Decennial Census as a pro-
totype. The teacher would contrast statistical inference from a probabilistic sampling scheme
with directly observing a quantity from the census, regarding the latter as the gold standard,
if not the ground truth. This narrative may have left many quantitative researchers with the
impression that the Census is always comprehensive and accurate. The reality, however, in-
variably departs from this ideal.
The Census is a survey, and is subject to many kinds of errors and uncertainties as do all sur-
veys. As do coverage bias, non-response, erroneous and edited inputs, statistical disclosure
limitation introduces a source of uncertainty into the survey, albeit unique in nature. From the
viewpoints of both assessing the quality of the end data product and improving it to a highest
extent possible, it is constructive to construe privacy as one of several interrelated contributors
to the total survey error (TSE; Groves, 2005).
Errors due to privacy make up a source of non-sampling survey error (Biemer, 2010). Additive
mechanisms create privacy errors that bear a close structural resemblance with measurement
errors (Reiter, 2019). What sets privacy apart from other sources of survey error, for the better
no less, is that the generative process of privacy error is entirely within control of the curator.
Transparency brings several notable advantages to the game, rendering privacy errors easier to
deal with than typical measurement errors. Privacy errors are known to enjoy desirable proper-
ties such as simple and tractable probability distributions, statistical independence among error
terms, as well as between errors and the underlying confidential data (i.e. parameter distinc-
tiveness). These properties may be assumptions for measurement errors, but they are known
to hold true for privacy errors. Unlike in the classic measurement error setting, where the error
variance need to be estimated, the theoretical variance of all the additive privacy mechanisms
are known and public. The structural similarity between privacy errors and measurement er-
rors allow for the straightforward adaptation of existing tools for measurement error modeling,
including regression calibration and simulation extrapolation which perform well for a wide
class of generalized linear models. Other approaches that aim to remedy the effect of both
missing data and measurement errors can be modified to include privacy errors (Kim et al.,
2014, 2015; Blackwell et al., 2017a,b). Most recently, steps are being taken to develop methods
for direct bias correction in the regression context (Evans and King, aper).
We emphasize here again that the transparency of the privacy mechanism is particularly crucial
to the understanding, quantification, and control of its impact on the quality of the resulting
survey from a total survey of error approach. As noted in Karr (2017), traditional disclosure
limitation methods often passively interact with other data processing and error reduction pro-
cedures commonly applied to surveys, and the effect of such interaction is often subtle. Due
to the artificial nature of privacy, any interaction between errors due to the privacy mechanism
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can be explicitly investigated and quantified, either theoretically or via simulation, strength-
ening the quality of the end data product by taking out the guess work. It is particularly
convenient that the mathematical formulation of differential privacy employs the concept of
a privacy loss budget, which acts as a fine-grained tuning parameter for the performance of
the procedure. The framework is thus well-suited for integration with the total budget concept
as employed by the total survey error framework, and the error decomposition approach to
understanding the effect of the individual constituents. The price we pay for privacy can be
regarded as in trade off partially with the total utility, for example defined as the minimal mean
squared error achievable by an optimal survey design. The analysis can be instructive as early
as during the planning phase of the survey, as the cost of privacy can be anticipated before the
survey is administered.
When privatization is a transparent procedure, it does not merely add to the total error of an
otherwise confidential survey. We have reasons to believe that it may in fact help reduce the
error via means of human psychology. A primary cause of inaccuracy in the Census is nonre-
sponse and imperfect coverage, much having to do with insufficient public trust, both in the
privacy protection of disseminated data products and in the Census Bureau’s ability to main-
tain confidentiality of sensitive information (Singer et al., 1993; Sullivan, 2020). Transparent
privacy assuages both concerns. The certainty of knowing that our information is protected in
a particular way – one that is explicit, provable, and vetted by communities of interested data
users – restores confidence in a respondent, and improves his or her chance to respond truth-
fully. Even a small progress in this direction can greatly enhance the quality of the Census,
reducing potentially immense cost that systematic nonresponse biases may impose on subse-
quent social and policy decisions.
The intersection between the algorithmic construction of differential privacy and the theoretical
explorations of total survey error cross-pollinates, sparking promising research directions and
synergistic methodological developments that can serve the dual purpose of efficient privacy
protection as well as survey quality maximization. I will briefly discuss one such interaction.
Discussing “TSE-aware SDL”, Karr (2017) advocates that when additive privacy mechanisms
are employed, the optimal choice of privacy error covariance should accord to the measurement
error covariance. The resulting data release demonstrates superior utility in terms of closeness
to the confidential data distribution in the sense of minimal Kullbeck-Leibler divergence. This
proposal, when accepted into the differential privacy framework, requires generalizing the
vanilla algorithms to produce correlated noise while preserving the privacy guarantee. Dif-
ferential privacy researchers have looked in this direction and offered tools adaptable to this
purpose. For example, Nikolov et al. (2013) proposed a correlated Gaussian mechanism for lin-
ear queries, and demonstrated it is an optimal mechanism among (e, δ)-differentially private
mechanisms in terms of minimizing the mean squared error for the released data product. A
privacy mechanism structurally designed to express the theory of survey error minimization
paves the most straightforward, and indeed most rewarding, path towards optimized utility in
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the end data product.
5 The quest for full transparency: are we there yet?
The collection of economic and social data is a widely practiced tradition in many civilizations,
one that traces back hundreds if not thousands of years. It was not until the latter part of the
20th century, however, that the need to defend individuals’ confidentiality became recognized
as a worthy scholarly pursuit (Oberski and Kreuter, 2020). Despite privacy being a youthful
subject, over a mere couple of decades we have come a long way in advancing the art and the
science of privacy protection. The progress was driven by a series of embarrassments (some
mentioned in Section 1), an awareness shared by major data curators including official statis-
tics agencies, corporations and research institutions, and most importantly the hard work of
computer scientists and statisticians who keep inventing new techniques to replace the old.
Transparent privacy is a most significant milestone this progress has reached, a gift bestowed
upon us by the continued advancements of privacy research. In defiance of the common cour-
tesy to “not look a gift horse in the mouth”, however, a perpetually curious researcher must
ask the ungrateful question: is this transparency all we can ask for?
The truth is, just as some gifts are more practically useful than others, some transparent privacy
is more approachable than others. An example of transparent privacy that is appreciated yet
difficult to work with arises with post-processing, that is, when the need for privacy is met si-
multaneously with the mandated release of certain invariant information. Invariants are a set of
exact statistics calculated based on the confidential microdata (Ashmead et al., 2019). They’re
mandated in the sense that all versions of the privatized data that the curator can possibly re-
lease must accord to these values. Typically, invariants represent crucial use cases for which
the answers cannot afford to be “tempered with”. For example the total population of each
state, as well as the voting-age population of each state are deemed as invariants, because they
serve as the basis for the allocation of house seats, the constitutional purpose of the Census in
the first place. What information constitutes invariant is ultimately a policy decision.
Invariants don’t get along with differential privacy mechanisms in a straightforward manner.
Indeed, if a query function had random noise added to it, there is no guarantee that it still
satisfies a set of constraints as does the noiseless version, such as the sum of its output. The
task of ensuring privatized Census data releases to be invariant-respecting is performed by the
TopDown algorithm (Abowd et al., 2019). At the heart of the algorithm employs two post-
processing steps, first a nonnegative L2 optimization followed by an L1 optimization, to ensure
that the output tabulations consist of only nonnegative integers while satisfying all constraints
posed by the invariants. It has been recognized, however, that these post-processing steps can
create unexpected anomalies in the released tabulations, namely systematic positive biases for
smaller counts and negative biases for larger counts, at a magnitude that tends to overwhelm
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the amount of inaccuracy due to privacy alone (Devine et al., 2020).
These observed adverse effects of post-processing should not strike as unanticipated. Projective
optimizations, be they L2 and L1, are essentially regression adjustments on a collection of data
points. The departures that the resulting values exhibit in the direction opposite to the original
values is a manifestation of the Galtonian regression towards the mean phenomenon (Stigler,
2016). Furthermore, whenever an unbiased and unbounded estimator is aposteriori confined to
a subdomain (here the pure differentially privatized tabulations constrained to the nonnegative
integers), the unbiasedness property it once enjoyed can no longer hold (Berger, 1990).
Nevertheless, the optimization algorithm that imposes invariants can be entirely procedurally
transparent. The design of the TopDown algorithm is documented in the Census Bureau’s
own publication (Abowd et al., 2019), accompanied by a suite of demonstration products and
the GitHub codebase (2020 Census DAS Development Team, 2019). The sore point here is
that mere procedural transparency may not be good enough. In a recently released summary
of the Committee on National Statistics (CNSTAT) workshop dedicated to the assessment of
the 2020 Census DAS, Hotz and Salvo (2020) noted that post-processing of privatized data
can be particularly difficult to model statistically. This is because the optimization imposes
an extremely complex, indeed data-dependent, function to the confidential data, such that a
distributional description of the algorithm’s output is almost impossible to characterize. If the
statistical properties of the end data releases cannot be simply described, from the end user’s
point of view it is practically no different from not knowing the privatization mechanism at all.
The evolution of privacy science over the years reflects a growing dynamic between several
branches of data science as they collectively benefit from vastly improved computational and
data storage abilities. What we’re witnessing today is a paradigm shift in the science of curating
official, social and personal statistics. A change of this scale is bound to exert seismic impact
on the ways that quantitative evidence is used and interpreted, raising novel questions and
opportunities in all disciplines that rely on these data sources (Oberski and Kreuter, 2020). In
pursuit of a modern paradigm for disclosure limitation, the Census Bureau openly engaged
data users and sought for constructive feedback when devising the 2020 DAS system, through
a series of demonstration data product and codebase releases (US Census Bureau, 2020a), and
through their presence at numerous academic and professional society meetings, including the
Joint Statistical Meeting, the CNSTAT workshop, and the 2019 Harvard Data Science Institute
Conference in which I participated as a discussant. The reactions from the academic data user
communities are a passionate mix, with some cheering for the innovation while others worried
about the practical impact on the usability of differentially privatized releases. In keeping up
with the inquiries and criticisms, the Census Bureau assembled and published a set of data
quality metrics to be assessed repeatedly as the design of the 2020 DAS iterates (US Census
Bureau, 2020b). The protection of privacy is not just a legal or policy mandate, but an ethical
treatment of all individuals who contribute to the collective betterment of science and society
with their information. As privacy research continue to evolve, an open and cross-disciplinary
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conversation is the catalyst to the most fitting solution. Partaking in this conversation is our
opportunity to defend democracy in its modern form: underpinned by numbers (Sullivan,
2020), and elevated by our respect for one another as more than just numbers.
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A Proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 gives a large sample approximation to the distribution of the naive regression slope
estimator for privatized data, which takes the form of
bˆ1 =
∑ni=1 (x˜i − ¯˜x) (y˜i − ¯˜y)
∑ni=1 (x˜i − ¯˜x)2
=
∑ni=1 ((xi − x¯) + (ui − u¯)) (β1 (xi − x¯) + (vi − v¯) + (ei − e¯))
∑ni=1 ((xi − x¯) + (ui − u¯))2
Writing ci = vi + ei and ai = xi − x¯, we have that
bˆ1 =
∑ni=1 (ai + ui − u¯) (β1ai + ci − c¯)
∑ni=1 (ai + ui − u¯)2
=
1
n ∑
n
i=1 (ai + ui) (β1ai + ci − c¯)
1
n ∑
n
i=1 (ai + ui)
2 − u¯2 =:
An
Bn
Using independence between ci and ui, denoting the sample variance and kurtosis of x as
vxn :=
1
n
n
∑
i=1
a2i , k
x
n :=
1
n
n
∑
i=1
a4i ,
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assuming that limn→∞ kxn = k > 0 exists and is well-defined. We have that by law of large
numbers,
An − β1vxn
p→ 0, Bn −
(
vxn + σ
2
u
) p→ 0,
thus
bˆ1
p→ γnβ1
where γn =
vxn
vxn+σ2u
is the biasing coefficient for the naive slope estimator bˆ1. To establish the
Central Limit Theorem result, let us first consider
A′n =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
(ai + ui) (β1ai + ci) = An − c¯u¯,
B′n =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
(ai + ui)
2 = Bn + u¯2.
We have that
√
n (An − γnβ1Bn) =
√
n
(
A′n − γnβ1B′n
)
+
√
nc¯u¯−√nγnβ1u¯2,
where
√
nc¯u¯
p→ 0 and √nγnβ1u¯2 p→ 0.The following Central Limit Theorem holds:
√
n
(
A′n − γnβ1B′n√
Σn
)
=
1√
nΣn
[
n
∑
i=1
(ai + ui) (β1ai + ci)− γnβ1
n
∑
i=1
(ai + ui)
2
]
d→ N (0, 1)
where
Σn =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
E
(
(ai + ui) (β1ai + ci)− γnβ1 (ai + ui)2
)2
= γ2nβ
2
1
(
1
n∑ a
4
i + 6σ
2
u
1
n∑ a
2
i + 6σ
4
u
)
− 2γnβ21
(
1
n∑ a
4
i + 3σ
2
u
1
n∑ a
2
i
)
+
β21
(
1
n∑ a
4
i + σ
2
u
1
n∑ a
2
i
)
+
(
σ2v + σ
2) ( 1
n∑ a
2
i + σ
2
u
)
= β21
[
γ2n
(
kxn + 6σ
2
uv
x
n + 6σ
4
u
)
− 2γn
(
kxn + 3σ
2
uv
x
n
)
+ kxn + σ
2
uv
x
n
]
+
(
σ2v + σ
2) (vxn + σ2u) ,
noting that for each i,
E
(
(ai + ui) (β1ai + ci)− γnβ1 (ai + ui)2
)2
= E ((ai + ui) (β1ai + ci))
2 + γ2nβ
2
1E (ai + ui)
4 − 2γnβ1E (β1ai + ci) (ai + ui)3 ,
= E (β1ai + ci)
2 E (ai + ui)
2 + γ2nβ
2
1E (ai + ui)
4 − 2γnβ21aiE (ai + ui)3
= γ2nβ
2
1
(
a4i + 6a
2
i σ
2
u + 6σ
4
u
)
− 2γnβ21
(
a4i + 3a
2
i σ
2
u
)
+
(
β21a
2
i + σ
2
v + σ
2) (a2i + σ2u) ,
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where for ui a centralized Laplace variable,
E (ai + ui)
2 = a2i + σ
2
u ; E (ai + ui)
3 = a3i + 3aiσ
2
u ; E (ai + ui)
4 = a4i + 6a
2
i σ
2
u + 6σ
4
u .
Thus with bˆ1 = An/Bn, we have that the Central Limit Theorem for the naive slope estimator
is
√
n
(
bˆ1 − γnβ1√
σ˜n
)
=
√
n (A′n − γnβ1B′n) +
√
nc¯u¯−√nγnβ1u¯2
Bn
√
σ˜n
d→ N (0, 1)
where
σ˜n =
(
vxn + σ
2
u
)−2
Σ
=
β21
[
γ2n
(
kxn + 6σ2uvxn + 6σ4u
)− 2γn (kxn + 3σ2uvxn)+ kxn + σ2uvxn]+ (σ2v + σ2) (vxn + σ2u)
(vxn + σ2u)
2 .
As a special case when no privacy protection is performed on either x or y, i.e. σu = σv = 0,
then γn = 1 for all n and σ˜n = σ2/vxn gives the usual sampling distribution result for βˆ1.
B Equivalence between (3.3) and (3.5)
The true posterior distribution in (3.3) is fully spelled out as
piξ (β | s˜) =
∫
pi (β, s, s˜) ds∫ ∫
pi (β, s, s˜) dsdβ
=
pi0 (β)
∫
pξ (s˜ | s)L (β; s) ds∫
pi0 (β)
∫
pξ (s˜ | s)L (β; s) dsdβ
=
pi0 (β)Lξ (β; s˜)∫
pi0 (β)Lξ (β; s˜) dβ .
Noting that
pi (β | s) = pi0 (β)L (β; s)∫
pi0 (β)L (β; s) dβ
and
piξ (s | s˜) =
∫
pi0 (β) pξ (s˜ | s)L (β; s) dβ∫ ∫
pi0 (β) pξ (s˜ | s)L (β; s) dβds
=
pξ (s˜ | s)
∫
pi0 (β)L (β; s) dβ∫
pξ (s˜ | s)
∫
pi0 (β)L (β; s) dβds ,
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we have that the right hand side of (3.5)
∫
pi (β | s)piξ (s | s˜) ds =
∫
pi0 (β)L (β; s)∫
pi0 (β)L (β; s) dβ ·
pξ (s˜ | s)
∫
pi0 (β)L (β; s) dβ∫
pξ (s˜ | s)
∫
pi0 (β)L (β; s) dβds ds
=
∫
pξ (s˜ | s)pi0 (β)L (β; s) ds∫
pξ (s˜ | s)
∫
pi0 (β)L (β; s) dβds
=
pi0 (β)
∫
pξ (s˜ | s)L (β; s) ds∫
pi0 (β)
∫
pξ (s˜ | s)L (β; s) dsdβ
=
pi0 (β)Lξ (β; s˜)∫
pi0 (β)Lξ (β; s˜) dβ = piξ (β | s˜) ,
establishing the equivalence between (3.3) and (3.5).
C Details of the MCEM algorithm.
The Monte Carlo Expectation Maximization (MCEM) via importance sampling algorithm works
as follows for the linear regression example. The data generative mechanism is
xi ∼ Pois (10) , yi = −5 + 4xi + ei, ei ∼ N
(
0, σ2 = 52
)
,
followed by additive privatization
x˜i = xi + ui, y˜i = yi + vi, ui, vi ∼ Lap
(
e−1
)
.
The goal is to estimate the parameter values, here set at β0 = −5, β1 = 4, with maximum
likelihood estimation. At the E-step, approximate the conditional expectation of the complete
data likelihood with respect to the observed data and the parameter estimate at the current
iteration
Q(β; β(t)) = E
(
logL (β; s, s˜) | s˜, β(t)
)
= E
(
logL(β; s) | s˜, β(t)
)
+ const.
where the log likelihood of the missing data is
logL(β; s) = − 1
2σ2 ∑i
(yi − β0 − β1xi)2 ,
with score
S (β; s) =
∂
∂β
logL (β; s) = 1
σ2
(
∑i yi − nβ0 − β1 ∑i xi
∑i xiyi − β0 ∑i xi − β1 ∑i x2i
)
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and negative second derivative
i (β; s) = − ∂
2
∂β2
logL (β; s) = 1
σ2
(
n ∑i xi
∑i xi ∑i x2i
)
.
The approximation to the Q function is constructed with k = 1, . . . , K weighted samples of the
confidential data likelihood:
Qˆ(β; β(t)) =
1
∑k ωk
∑
k
ωk logL
(
β; s(t)k
)
,
where s(t)k ∼ L
(
β(t); s
)
consists of x(t)ik ∼ Pois (10) and y(t)ik = β(t)0 + β(t)1 x(t)ik + e(t)ik , where
e(t)ik ∼ N
(
0, σ2 = 52
)
for i = 1, . . . , 10. The weights are calculated as
ωk =∏
i
f
(
x(t)ik − x˜i; e−1
)
f
(
y(t)ik − y˜i; e−1
)
,
where f (·; b) is the Laplace density with scale parameter b. The M-step, maximizing Qˆ(β; β(t)),
occurs at β(t+1) which is the solution to the approximating score function being zero,
∂
∂β
Qˆ(β; β(t)) =
∑k ωkS
(
β; s(t)k
)
∑k ωk
=
1
σ2 ∑k ωk
∑
k
ωk
(
ny¯(t)k − nβ0 − β1nx¯(t)k
n(xy)
(t)
k − β0nx¯(t)k − β1n(x2)
(t)
k
)
= 0,
where y¯(t)k = n
−1 ∑i y
(t)
ik , (xy)
(t)
k = n
−1 ∑i x
(t)
ik y
(t)
ik , and so on. Writing the ω-weighted averages
as
y¯(t)ω =
∑k ωky¯
(t)
k
∑k ωk
, x¯(t)ω =
∑k ωk x¯
(t)
k
∑k ωk
, (xy)
(t)
ω =
∑k ωk(xy)
(t)
k
∑k ωk
, (x2)
(t)
ω =
∑k ωk(x2)
(t)
k
∑k ωk
,
we have that
β
(t+1)
0 = y¯
(t)
ω − β(t+1)1 x¯(t)ω ,
β
(t+1)
1 =
(xy)
(t)
ω − x¯(t)ω y¯(t)ω
(x2)
(t)
ω −
(
x¯(t)ω
)2 .
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Furthermore, the observed Fisher information can be approximated as
∑ωki
(
β; s(t)k
)
∑k ωk
−
∑ωkS
(
β; s(t)k
)
S>
(
β; s(t)k
)
∑k ωk
+
∑k ωkS
(
β; s(t)k
)
∑k ωk
∑k ωkS
(
β; s(t)k
)
∑k ωk
>
where the first term is equal to
∑ωki
(
β; s(t)k
)
∑k ωk
=
1
σ2
(
1 x¯(t)ω
x¯(t)ω (x2)
(t)
ω
)
,
the second equal to
− n
2
σ4 ∑k ωk
 ∑k ωk
(
y¯(t)k − β0 − β1 x¯(t)k
)2
∑k ωk
(
y¯(t)k − β0 − β1 x¯(t)k
)(
(xy)
(t)
k − β0 x¯(t)k − β1(x2)
(t)
k
)
.. ∑k ωk
(
(xy)
(t)
k − β0 x¯(t)k − β1(x2)
(t)
k
)2
 ,
and the third simply the outer product of the observed score from before.
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